A "Presidency-Augmented" Model of Presidential Success on House Roll Call Votes
A "presidency-augmented" model of presidential-congressional relations is compared to the "Congress-centered" model as explanations of variation in presidential success on roll call votes in the House. (1) Presidents should win more on votes concerning 'on agenda' bills...
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Veröffentlicht in: | American journal of political science 1995-11, Vol.39 (4), p.1001-1024 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | A "presidency-augmented" model of presidential-congressional relations is compared to the "Congress-centered" model as explanations of variation in presidential success on roll call votes in the House. (1) Presidents should win more on votes concerning 'on agenda' bills and bills they support than on "off agenda" bills or bills they oppose. (2) "On agenda" votes should receive more support from the president's congressional leaders than "off agenda" votes. (3) Compared to minority party presidents, a larger share of the bills on which majority party presidents take positions should be "on agenda" and be bills they support. (4) Party support for the president should be higher when congressional leaders support the president than when the leaders are divided or oppose the president. Probit and difference of means tests of roll call voting data collected from Congressional Quarterly. Models that take presidential actions into account explain variations in presidential success better than the more simple "Congress-centered" model. |
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ISSN: | 0092-5853 1540-5907 |
DOI: | 10.2307/2111667 |