The future of Germany's federal state: constitutional guidelines for a change of the system
Some traditional arguments in favour of a federal state no longer justify the present system in Germany. Its high costs and slow reaction to change, as well as continued European integration could substantiate the call for abandoning the federal system in favour of a centralised state. In contrast t...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 2004-09, Vol.35 (3), p.409-427 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | ger |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | Some traditional arguments in favour of a federal state no longer justify the present system in Germany. Its high costs and slow reaction to change, as well as continued European integration could substantiate the call for abandoning the federal system in favour of a centralised state. In contrast to widespread opinion, the constitution does not stand in the way of a centralised state. The so-called eternity clause (Article 79 GG) protects the federal state only against the legislature (pouvoir constitué). The constitutional power of the people (pouvoir constituant), as recognised in the reserve clause (Article 146 GG), is, however, neither restricted by the eternity clause nor linked to the federal system, so that it would be possible to abolish federalism. Reprinted by permission of the VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Germany |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0340-1758 |