A Political-Institutional Interpretation of Legislative Oversight Mechanisms & Behavior

Rather unexpectedly, we have been hearing of a significant increase in oversight activity by members of Congress and state legislatures. Professor Ethridge attributes this development to changes in interest group politics that make certain kinds of oversight politically profitable. He goes on to arg...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Polity 1984-12, Vol.17 (2), p.340-359
1. Verfasser:	Ethridge, Marcus E.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Administrative agencies Administrative law Advertising restrictions BEHAVIORISM CONGRESS (ALL NATIONS) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, SEE SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE AREA Congressional legislation DECISION-MAKING AND GAME THEORY Industrial regulation LEGISLATIVE BODIES Legislative process (oversight) Legislators LEGITIMACY ORGANIZED COLLECTIVE ARGUMENT OVER/SIGHT POLITICAL BEHAVIOR POLITICAL OPPOSITION POLITICAL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE Political theory Public administration Regulatory legislation RELATIONS AMONG GROUPS Review committees STATE GOVERNMENT STATES Statutory law UNITED STATES, 1945 TO PRESENT
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Zusammenfassung:	Rather unexpectedly, we have been hearing of a significant increase in oversight activity by members of Congress and state legislatures. Professor Ethridge attributes this development to changes in interest group politics that make certain kinds of oversight politically profitable. He goes on to argue that legislative committees charged with oversight are able to subdue opposition to their work by adopting institutional perspectives that both limit and legitimize their decisions.
ISSN:	0032-3497 1744-1684
DOI:	10.2307/3234511