Coalitions in Mixed-Sex Triads

Exp's in which 3-person groups play a competitive game have revealed signif sex diff's in strategy. A situation is presented with a majority of one sex & a minority of the other. played 12 games, 2 each of 6 power-patterns. By varying the weights drawn at the outset of each game, conditions were established in which all members were equal, or there were internal diff's in weight (but a coalition between any 2 could win), or despite internal diff's, one member could win without a coalition. Play was analyzed in terms of strength of members, majority vs minority relations, bargaining & final outcome. The following conclusions are reached: (1) both sexes, when in the majority, tend to ally against the minority of the other sex, but it is esp typical of F's to ally when weak & of M's to ally when strong, (2) F's, when in the minority, tend to ally with a M when this is not necessary to win; the M minority under the same condition refuses to ally, (3) the M initiates offers to ally, esp when in the majority, (4) there is more bargaining in groups with a M majority early in play, but no diff between the 2 kinds of group late in play-bargaining increases late in play in both types of group, (5) when a cumulative score is maintained, groups with a M majority show a tendency for those who are behind at the time to ally against the member who is ahead. Similar alliances in groups with a F majority tend to occur only when those behind are also weak, (6) the F arrives at a relatively better final outcome than the M; this is esp pronounced when the F is in the minority & (7) All of these phenomena point to diff's between the sexes, formulated here as M exploitative strategy vs F accommodative strategy. The former appears to be self-defeating when it encounters the latter. AA.