Is Justification Scientifically Impossible?

A theoretical discussion of the possibility of obtaining rational justification in pol, despite the 'irrationalist' explanation of human conduct expounded by Marxist & psychoanalytical theory. While the explanation of an act requires its location historically in a causal sequence of events, its justification is effected through 'locating it within a more comprehensive structure of beliefs & att's & actions & by claiming the man's normative right, in the light of this total structure, to believe as he does.' To speak not only in terms of 'source causes' of behavior, but also in terms of 'goal causes', is absolutely necessary, 'if we are to take practical account of everyday experience.' Both extreme rationalism (of the 17th cent variety), & extreme irrationalism (so widely accepted in the 20th cent), are j rejected as balanced pictures of human motivation; 'even if the irrationalists' theories were relatively adequate, they would bear only upon the description & the explanation of a belief or action or att, & not at all upon its justification.' The 'classic case' of psychol'al 'rationalization' is examined at length, concluding that an a priori rejection of all rational explanations of behavior cannot be based on this theory, since the genetic 'why' of our actions can be distinguished from the rational 'why'. The 'consequential fallacy' of Marxist econ ideology is rejected along with the preceding 'genetic fallacy' of psychoanalysis, at least for some cases in some instances (eg, pol'al belief). In conclusion, K. Mannheim's analysis of the problem in his IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA is examined closely, stating that Morgan 'will gladly go just as far with Mannheim as anyone can possibly go, without giving up the right of sci & philosophy to say something, . . . & something signif, about human situations.' (See SA 0103-B2265). L. Gimenez Melo.