Groups Are Real: A Reaffirmation

Contemporary writings exhibit 4 major orientations to the group & to the question of its reality: (1) nominalism; (2) interactionism; (3) neo-nominalism; & (4) realism. The nominalist view, the oldest & most extreme position in light of present knowledge, holds that a group is not a real entity but merely an assemblage of individuals. This orientation, which holds that individuals are the only reality, is implicit in much of the current work on small groups. The interactionist point of view stresses the indivisibility of the group & the individual. Neither group nor individual is real except in terms of the other. The neo-nominalist orientation gives to 'group' an objective reality but claims that it is less real than persons, for the group is made of persons & of processes which have their locus & origin in the person. Modern realism holds that while the group is just as real as the person both are abstract, not concrete, entities. This doctrine further holds that the group is understandable in distinctly soc processes, not by reference to individual psychol. The legitimacy of the realist position is defended by examining 4 arguments against it: (1) persons can be seen, but not groups, except by observing persons; (2) groups consist of persons; (3) soc phenomena have their reality only in persons; & (4) groups are studied for the purpose of understanding & predicting individual behavior. It is suggested that a priori rejection of realism is founded upon fallacy & misconception. Only when we treat groups as real will we begin to advance in a uniquely sociol'al manner. W. F. Kenkel.