Free Trade from the Bottom Up
The case for trade negotiations from the free-trade perspective is more nuanced than is commonly understood. When structured properly, international trade agreements can provide a useful supplement to purely unilateral liberalization. Such agreements can help overcome political obstacles that hinder...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Cato journal 2000-01, Vol.19 (3), p.359-369 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The case for trade negotiations from the free-trade perspective is more nuanced than is commonly understood. When structured properly, international trade agreements can provide a useful supplement to purely unilateral liberalization. Such agreements can help overcome political obstacles that hinder the opening of markets. The case for trade negotiations from the free-trade perspective is more nuanced than is commonly understood. Negotiations are not required for trade liberalization to occur; after all, the most dramatic progress in market-opening over the past couple of decades has occurred through unilateral reforms at the national level. Furthermore, negotiations, if conducted incorrectly, can actually undermine the free-trade cause. When structured properly, though, international trade agreements can provide a useful supplement to purely unilateral liberalization. Such agreements can help overcome political obstacles that hinder the opening of markets; also, they can consolidate market-opening gains and make them harder to reverse. The key to maximizing negotiated liberalization's advantages, and avoiding its pitfalls, is found in the bottom-up vision of international economic interest. Accordingly, the proper model for trade negotiations is not mercantilist-minded reciprocity but rather coordinated unilateralism. |
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ISSN: | 0273-3072 1943-3468 |