Free Trade from the Bottom Up

The case for trade negotiations from the free-trade perspective is more nuanced than is commonly understood. When structured properly, international trade agreements can provide a useful supplement to purely unilateral liberalization. Such agreements can help overcome political obstacles that hinder...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The Cato journal 2000-01, Vol.19 (3), p.359-369
1. Verfasser: Lindsey, Brink
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The case for trade negotiations from the free-trade perspective is more nuanced than is commonly understood. When structured properly, international trade agreements can provide a useful supplement to purely unilateral liberalization. Such agreements can help overcome political obstacles that hinder the opening of markets. The case for trade negotiations from the free-trade perspective is more nuanced than is commonly understood. Negotiations are not required for trade liberalization to occur; after all, the most dramatic progress in market-opening over the past couple of decades has occurred through unilateral reforms at the national level. Furthermore, negotiations, if conducted incorrectly, can actually undermine the free-trade cause. When structured properly, though, international trade agreements can provide a useful supplement to purely unilateral liberalization. Such agreements can help overcome political obstacles that hinder the opening of markets; also, they can consolidate market-opening gains and make them harder to reverse. The key to maximizing negotiated liberalization's advantages, and avoiding its pitfalls, is found in the bottom-up vision of international economic interest. Accordingly, the proper model for trade negotiations is not mercantilist-minded reciprocity but rather coordinated unilateralism.
ISSN:0273-3072
1943-3468