Plutonium, Proliferation and the Price of Reprocessing

Europe and the U.S. no longer share the same views on the reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors as it applies to the separation and export of plutonium. Most of the spent fuel that the U.S. is concerned about is under U.S. control. Government policies have made the implementation of the U.S. nonproliferation policy a balancing act. Commercial rivalry complicates the efforts to find solutions for the problems of international security and nuclear energy. The U.S felt that bilateral and international inspections would prevent the diversion of these fuels for military purposes. It initially pushed the development of plutonium-fueled breeder reactors, but insufficient safeguards turned U.S. policy around. The U.S. nonproliferation policy is based on 2 elements: 1. concern that nationally held stocks of plutonium could not be protected, and 2. the fact that current reprocessing and recycling methods are economically dubious and introduction into international trade is dangerous. International storage of plutonium raises many questions regarding security, accounting, and returning stocks to national ownership. Plutonium cannot be put into the stream of commerce until the rules have been revised. Those rules must be strict, uniform, and universal.