The Evolution of Norms
Social norms that induce one to reward or punish people for what they did to other member's of one's group have long been thought as sine qua non sociologcial and thus impossible to explain in terms of rational choice. Bendor and Swistak show how social norms can be deductively derived fro...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American journal of sociology 2001-05, Vol.106 (6), p.1493-1545 |
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| container_end_page | 1545 |
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| container_issue | 6 |
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| container_title | The American journal of sociology |
| container_volume | 106 |
| creator | Bendor, Jonathan Swistak, Piotr |
| description | Social norms that induce one to reward or punish people for what they did to other member's of one's group have long been thought as sine qua non sociologcial and thus impossible to explain in terms of rational choice. Bendor and Swistak show how social norms can be deductively derived from principles of rational choice as mechanisms that are necessary to stabilize behaviors in a large class of evolutionary games. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/321298 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-9602 |
| ispartof | The American journal of sociology, 2001-05, Vol.106 (6), p.1493-1545 |
| issn | 0002-9602 1537-5390 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60085428 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Sociological Abstracts; Periodicals Index Online; Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); Jstor Complete Legacy |
| subjects | Behavior Behavior Standards Behavioral Sciences Bounded rationality Equilibrium Evolution Evolutionary Theories Feedback (Response) Game Theory Games Games theory Intuition Norms Punishment Rational Choice Rational choice theory Sanctions Social Behavior Social behaviour Social norms Social sciences Social theory Sociology Statistical Data Traditions Values |
| title | The Evolution of Norms |
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