The Evolution of Norms

The Evolution of Norms

Social norms that induce one to reward or punish people for what they did to other member's of one's group have long been thought as sine qua non sociologcial and thus impossible to explain in terms of rational choice. Bendor and Swistak show how social norms can be deductively derived fro...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The American journal of sociology 2001-05, Vol.106 (6), p.1493-1545
Hauptverfasser: Bendor, Jonathan, Swistak, Piotr
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Behavior
Behavior Standards
Behavioral Sciences
Bounded rationality
Equilibrium
Evolution
Evolutionary Theories
Feedback (Response)
Game Theory
Games
Games theory
Intuition
Norms
Punishment
Rational Choice
Rational choice theory
Sanctions
Social Behavior
Social behaviour
Social norms
Social sciences
Social theory
Sociology
Statistical Data
Traditions
Values
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Social norms that induce one to reward or punish people for what they did to other member's of one's group have long been thought as sine qua non sociologcial and thus impossible to explain in terms of rational choice. Bendor and Swistak show how social norms can be deductively derived from principles of rational choice as mechanisms that are necessary to stabilize behaviors in a large class of evolutionary games.
ISSN:0002-9602
1537-5390
DOI:10.1086/321298