Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving
The development of negotiation theory over recent decades has been organized around two major paradigms: bargaining and problem solving. For the bargaining paradigm, indicators of flexibility include concession rates, initiation of new proposals, and other soft behaviors. For the problem-solving per...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1995-11, Vol.542 (1), p.24-47 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | The development of negotiation theory over recent decades has been organized around two major paradigms: bargaining and problem solving. For the bargaining paradigm, indicators of flexibility include concession rates, initiation of new proposals, and other soft behaviors. For the problem-solving perspective, flexibility is usually indicated by a search for better, mutually beneficial solutions to problems that satisfy the needs, identities, and interests of all parties. Empirical research generally reveals that bargaining behaviors are used more frequently in international negotiations than is problem solving. This may be explained by the dominance of the realist paradigm of international relations, within which most diplomats are socialized. Since diplomats generally construct their image of negotiations in terms of bargaining, it is hardly surprising that these behaviors should be prevalent in actual negotiations. In addition, empirical research methods utilized to study negotiations tend to emphasize bargaining variables, and more subtle problem-solving behaviors are more difficult to detect. The empirical prevalence of bargaining, however, does not imply that it is the best method to induce flexibility in international negotiations. On the contrary, most research tends to reveal that problem solving produces greater flexibility and more frequent, efficient, equitable, and durable agreements than bargaining does. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0002-7162 1552-3349 |
DOI: | 10.1177/0002716295542001003 |