Compensation for Historic Injustices: Completing the Boxill and Sher Argument

In separate recent articles, Bernard Boxill and George Sher argue that transgressors owe their victims reparation for an injustice and that the failure to provide such reparation is a further wrong against the victim. Boxill and Sher admit that an original injustice might be a condition of a victim's descendant's existence. They argue, however, that a later injustice of not compensating the victim after her child is conceived can be a compensable wrong to that child but not be a condition of the child's existence. The Boxill/Sher argument is convincing as far as it goes. Yet it fails to specify fully the conditions under which people can justify claims to compensation for children born to victims of historic injustice. Here, Cohen proposes to complete their account by specifying such conditions. He argues that children can claim compensation only for those welfare gains their parents' transgressor unjustly denied the children. Along the way, Cohen discusses problems with sustaining reparation claims across generations and the challenge of fixing the welfare baselines that are the targets of filial duties.