Democratization Effects of Campaign Contribution Limits in Gubernatorial Elections

Campaign contribution limits have become a common feature of campaign finance reform efforts in most states. The use of contribution limits has been seen as an important mechanism by which to lessen the influence of so-called `special interests' and to encourage citizen participation. Contribution limits could `democratize' the system of contributions by forcing candidates to rely on a larger number of smaller contributions, thereby reducing the value of any single contribution. In this article, we focus on the alleged `democratization' effects of campaign contribution limits. We examine 58 gubernatorial elections in 42 states during the period 1990 to 2000. Analyses of the number of contributors, the total dollar amount of contributions and the average amount given by contributors suggest that contribution limits do have a democratization effect. The nature of the effect, however, depends upon whether one examines all contributors, just particularistic contributors or just individualistic contributors.