Presidential Strategy in the Judicial Appointment Process
I examine presidential use of public appeals on behalf of nominees to the U.S. courts of appeals from 1977 to 2005. Presidents Clinton and W. Bush have utilized this strategy far more regularly than did their predecessors. I find that presidents go public more often and more quickly on behalf of nom...
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Veröffentlicht in: | American politics research 2007-09, Vol.35 (5), p.567-594 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | I examine presidential use of public appeals on behalf of nominees to the U.S. courts of appeals from 1977 to 2005. Presidents Clinton and W. Bush have utilized this strategy far more regularly than did their predecessors. I find that presidents go public more often and more quickly on behalf of nominees facing a difficult confirmation climate, as well as on behalf of those who would diversify the bench. However, nominees who received more presidential support were not more likely to be confirmed by the Senate and appeared to be less likely to be confirmed. These findings indicate an important shift in presidential strategy concerning appointments to the courts of appeals in the newly politicized confirmation climate. These findings also provide evidence that presidents may be motivated by factors beyond confirmation success when determining how to expend public support on behalf of individuals nominated to these important courts. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2007.] |
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ISSN: | 1532-673X |
DOI: | 10.1177/1532673X07301807 |