International Law, U. S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism

The role of international law in Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith's (2005) interpretative framework of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001) is examined. Two central difficulties with Bradley & Goldsmith's structure are highlighted: their scrutiny of law of armed conflict principles failed to identify existing limitations upon executive power & their identification of the conditions necessary for implementing core war powers is erroneous. Countering Bradley & Goldsmith's contention that certain presidential powers are ambiguously stipulated, it is maintained that extant law of armed conflict principles clearly articulate limitations upon executive authority. Three examples are given to illuminate the deficiencies of Bradley & Goldsmith's framework: the categorization of certain individuals as enemy combatants; the authorization of the power to detain enemy combatants; & the adjudication of suspected war criminals in special military commissions. It is concluded that law of armed conflict guidelines should occupy a prominent place in the elucidation of the Authorization for Use of Military Force. Z. Zendejas