Balanced Budgets and State Surpluses: The Politics of Budgeting in Illinois
Proposals for a national balanced budget amendment have implicitly assumed that we all know a balanced budget when we see one. This case study of the politics of budgeting under a balanced budget constraint indicates that the concepts of a balanced budget and of surpluses are not neutral accounting...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Public administration review 1987-03, Vol.47 (2), p.143-152 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Proposals for a national balanced budget amendment have implicitly assumed that we all know a balanced budget when we see one. This case study of the politics of budgeting under a balanced budget constraint indicates that the concepts of a balanced budget and of surpluses are not neutral accounting terms without political implications. Instead, they are subject to political and accounting games that can misinform the public about fiscal status. We suggest looking at the budget in alternative ways that highlight the misinformation which current indicators provide. The implication throughout is that, before jumping to a national balanced budget amendment, experiences of the states should be examined to see what kinds of politics develop around such mechanical panaceas. |
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ISSN: | 0033-3352 1540-6210 |
DOI: | 10.2307/975588 |