Discriminating Alternative Conceptions of False Recognition: The Cases of Word Concreteness and Word Frequency

A classical finding in recognition memory is that participants falsely recognize new high-frequency words more than new low-frequency words. Similarly, participants falsely recognize new abstract words more than new concrete words. The authors contrast a memory-based explanation of these effects to...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition memory, and cognition, 1997-11, Vol.23 (6), p.1306-1323
Hauptverfasser: Hirshman, Elliot, Arndt, Jason
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:A classical finding in recognition memory is that participants falsely recognize new high-frequency words more than new low-frequency words. Similarly, participants falsely recognize new abstract words more than new concrete words. The authors contrast a memory-based explanation of these effects to a decision-based explanation. In the former explanation, differences in false recognition arise because some sets of new items have properties that discriminate them from study-list items stored in memory. In the latter explanation, differences in false recognition arise because some sets of old items are especially well remembered. This strong memory influences decision processes, with resulting effects on false recognition of new items. The authors test these views by examining the relationship between relative hit rates and relative false-alarm rates under a variety of encoding conditions. The results of 7 experiments support the memory-based approach.
ISSN:0278-7393
1939-1285
DOI:10.1037/0278-7393.23.6.1306