Unconscious Knowledge of Artifical Grammars Is Applied Strategically
The criteria by which incidentally acquired knowledge of an artificial grammar (A. S. Reber, 1967) could be unconscious was explored in 5 experiments. Participants trained on an artificial grammar lacked metaknowledge of their knowledge: Participants classified substantially above chance even when t...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition memory, and cognition, 1995-01, Vol.21 (5), p.1322-1338 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | The criteria by which incidentally acquired knowledge of an artificial grammar (A. S. Reber, 1967) could be unconscious was explored in 5 experiments. Participants trained on an artificial grammar lacked metaknowledge of their knowledge: Participants classified substantially above chance even when they believed that they were literally guessing, &, under some conditions, participants' confidence in incorrect decisions was just as great as their confidence in correct decisions. However, participants had a large degree of strategic control over their knowledge: Participants trained on 2 grammars could decide which grammar to apply in a test phase, & there was no detectable tendency for participants to apply the other grammar. 9 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 37 References. [Reprinted with permission from the American Psychological Association] |
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ISSN: | 0278-7393 |