Unconscious Knowledge of Artifical Grammars Is Applied Strategically

The criteria by which incidentally acquired knowledge of an artificial grammar (A. S. Reber, 1967) could be unconscious was explored in 5 experiments. Participants trained on an artificial grammar lacked metaknowledge of their knowledge: Participants classified substantially above chance even when t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition memory, and cognition, 1995-01, Vol.21 (5), p.1322-1338
Hauptverfasser: Dienes, Zoltan, Altmann, Gerry T M, Kwan, Liam, Goode, Alastair
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The criteria by which incidentally acquired knowledge of an artificial grammar (A. S. Reber, 1967) could be unconscious was explored in 5 experiments. Participants trained on an artificial grammar lacked metaknowledge of their knowledge: Participants classified substantially above chance even when they believed that they were literally guessing, &, under some conditions, participants' confidence in incorrect decisions was just as great as their confidence in correct decisions. However, participants had a large degree of strategic control over their knowledge: Participants trained on 2 grammars could decide which grammar to apply in a test phase, & there was no detectable tendency for participants to apply the other grammar. 9 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 37 References. [Reprinted with permission from the American Psychological Association]
ISSN:0278-7393