Apriorism in the Philosophy of Language

Presented is a motivation for the philosophical principle of "apriorism," which holds that the meaning of words are knowable a priori. The principle is commonly presupposed by most philosophers of lang & many linguists, but some recent works have entailed its denial. Apriorism is defended against Hilary Putnam's so-called Twin Earth example ("The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in Studies in the Philosophy of Science VII: Language, Mind, & Knowledge, Gunderson, K. [Ed], Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1975). Putnam argues that objectual meanings exist. This in turn poses problems for apriorisms, since objectual meanings are generally knowable a priori. However, further evaluation of the Twin Earth problem reveals flaws in Putnam's arguments & leads to a reaffirmation of apriorism. 21 References. B. Annesser Murray