Monopoly exclusion of lower cost entry: loyalty contracts in ocean shipping conferences

Monopoly exclusion of lower cost entry: loyalty contracts in ocean shipping conferences

If a lower cost entrant cannot satisfy the shipper's demand for frequency, the shipper will prefer to make loyalty contracts with the conference, so the entrant will be effectually excluded. (Original abstract)

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of transport economics and policy 1988-09, Vol.22 (Sep 88), p.339-344
1. Verfasser: Sjostrom, W
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Competition
Contracts
Exclusion
Lower cost competition
Loyalty
Monopoly
Shipping
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:If a lower cost entrant cannot satisfy the shipper's demand for frequency, the shipper will prefer to make loyalty contracts with the conference, so the entrant will be effectually excluded. (Original abstract)
ISSN:0022-5258