How We Know-and Sometimes Misjudge-What Others Know: Imputing One's Own Knowledge to Others

To communicate effectively, people must have a reasonably accurate idea about what specific other people know. An obvious starting point for building a model of what another knows is what one oneself knows, or thinks one knows. This article reviews evidence that people impute their own knowledge to...

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Veröffentlicht in:Psychological bulletin 1999-11, Vol.125 (6), p.737-759
1. Verfasser: Nickerson, Raymond S
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:To communicate effectively, people must have a reasonably accurate idea about what specific other people know. An obvious starting point for building a model of what another knows is what one oneself knows, or thinks one knows. This article reviews evidence that people impute their own knowledge to others and that, although this serves them well in general, they often do so uncritically, with the result of erroneously assuming that other people have the same knowledge. Overimputation of one's own knowledge can contribute to communication difficulties. Corrective approaches are considered. A conceptualization of where own-knowledge imputation fits in the process of developing models of other people's knowledge is proposed.
ISSN:0033-2909
1939-1455
DOI:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.737