Distributive consequences of a monetary union: what can we learn from a referendum?

Distributive consequences of a monetary union: what can we learn from a referendum?

A logit model is used to study the approval rate during the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty held in France in 1992. Results show a remarkable correlation between the approval rate in French departments and their economic characteristics as defined by the theory of optimum currency areas. They su...

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Veröffentlicht in:Applied economics letters 2002-07, Vol.9 (9), p.581-584
1. Verfasser: Meon, Pierre-Guillaume
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Applied economics
Correlation
Economic and Monetary Union
Economic conditions
France
Political support
Voting behaviour
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Zusammenfassung:A logit model is used to study the approval rate during the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty held in France in 1992. Results show a remarkable correlation between the approval rate in French departments and their economic characteristics as defined by the theory of optimum currency areas. They support the view that individual agents' opinions towards EMU depended on its impact on their welfare.
ISSN:1350-4851
1466-4291
DOI:10.1080/13504850110111180