Endogenous Obfuscation in Injury Investigations

Eligibility for public benefits may require an injury investigation. The thoroughness of the investigation is a policy decision of the government. An investigative authority chooses the optimal effort to infer from a noisy signal (business plan) the quality of management and market conditions when a...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economica (London) 2002-08, Vol.69 (275), p.505-523
1. Verfasser: Hartigan, James C.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Eligibility for public benefits may require an injury investigation. The thoroughness of the investigation is a policy decision of the government. An investigative authority chooses the optimal effort to infer from a noisy signal (business plan) the quality of management and market conditions when a firm petitions for benefits. Under plausible conditions, firms will underperform to raise the probability of an affirmative verdict, and the authority will expend low investigative effort. Good and bad managers will obtain relief under adverse market conditions. This is preferred by good managers, as they do not have to separate by sending a costly signal.
ISSN:0013-0427
1468-0335
DOI:10.1111/1468-0335.00296