A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

We consider a stable mechanism where each agent announces his/her own preferences and a stable matching is selected for the announced preference profile. We show that the mechanism implements the stable rule that selects all of the stable matchings in a strong equilibrium. In other words, when we se...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 1996-05, Vol.51 (2), p.185-189
Hauptverfasser: Shin, Sungwhee, Suh, Sang-Chul
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic analysis
Marriage
Matching
Stable rule
Strong Nash equilibrium
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container_title Economics letters
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creator Shin, Sungwhee
Suh, Sang-Chul
description We consider a stable mechanism where each agent announces his/her own preferences and a stable matching is selected for the announced preference profile. We show that the mechanism implements the stable rule that selects all of the stable matchings in a strong equilibrium. In other words, when we select any stable matching to an announced preference profile, in fact the matching is stable for the true preference profile in environments where agents' behaviors are described by a strong Nash equilibrium.
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source RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals; Periodicals Index Online
subjects Economic analysis
Marriage
Matching
Stable rule
Strong Nash equilibrium
title A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
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