A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
We consider a stable mechanism where each agent announces his/her own preferences and a stable matching is selected for the announced preference profile. We show that the mechanism implements the stable rule that selects all of the stable matchings in a strong equilibrium. In other words, when we se...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 1996-05, Vol.51 (2), p.185-189 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
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| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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| Zusammenfassung: | We consider a stable mechanism where each agent announces his/her own preferences and a stable matching is selected for the announced preference profile. We show that the mechanism implements the stable rule that selects all of the stable matchings in a strong equilibrium. In other words, when we select any stable matching to an announced preference profile, in fact the matching is stable for the true preference profile in environments where agents' behaviors are described by a strong Nash equilibrium. |
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| ISSN: | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1 |