Coalition-proof Information Exchanges

Coalition-proof Information Exchanges

In a three-firm oligopoly model we show that, in addition to being a simple Nash equilibrium, information sharing among all firms is sometimes coalitionproof, and, information exchange among a proper subset of the firms can constitute a coalition-proof equilibrium. Thus, information exchange among f...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Austria), 1996-01, Vol.63 (3), p.259-278
Hauptverfasser: Malueg, David A., Tsutsui, Shunichi O.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Coalitions
Complementary goods
Consumer surplus
Game theory
Information exchange
Information sharing
Marginal costs
Nash equilibrium
Oligopolies
Profitability theory
Quid pro quo
Substitute goods
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In a three-firm oligopoly model we show that, in addition to being a simple Nash equilibrium, information sharing among all firms is sometimes coalitionproof, and, information exchange among a proper subset of the firms can constitute a coalition-proof equilibrium. Thus, information exchange among firms, even without collusion on prices or outputs, can be very stable and may occur more widely than previously expected.
ISSN:0931-8658
1617-7134
DOI:10.1007/BF01227436