Allocation of CO2 Emissions Permits: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Policy Instruments
What are the effects of different ways of allocating CO2 emissions permits under a tradable permit scheme? Numerical simulations show that using the permit revenue to lower existing taxes implies by far the lowest welfare cost but also a large reduction in employment in energy-intensive sectors and...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of environmental economics and management 2000-09, Vol.40 (2), p.111-136 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | What are the effects of different ways of allocating CO2 emissions permits under a tradable permit scheme? Numerical simulations show that using the permit revenue to lower existing taxes implies by far the lowest welfare cost but also a large reduction in employment in energy-intensive sectors and substantial stranded costs. Grandfathering the permits compensates owners for losses on stranded investments but comes at a welfare cost and does not mitigate the adjustment imposed on the economy. Finally, distributing the permits according to market shares reduces the degree of sectoral adjustment but also comes at a high welfare cost. |
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ISSN: | 0095-0696 1096-0449 |
DOI: | 10.1006/jeem.1999.1112 |