Allocation of CO2 Emissions Permits: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Policy Instruments

What are the effects of different ways of allocating CO2 emissions permits under a tradable permit scheme? Numerical simulations show that using the permit revenue to lower existing taxes implies by far the lowest welfare cost but also a large reduction in employment in energy-intensive sectors and...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of environmental economics and management 2000-09, Vol.40 (2), p.111-136
Hauptverfasser: Jensen, Jesper, Rasmussen, Tobias N.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:What are the effects of different ways of allocating CO2 emissions permits under a tradable permit scheme? Numerical simulations show that using the permit revenue to lower existing taxes implies by far the lowest welfare cost but also a large reduction in employment in energy-intensive sectors and substantial stranded costs. Grandfathering the permits compensates owners for losses on stranded investments but comes at a welfare cost and does not mitigate the adjustment imposed on the economy. Finally, distributing the permits according to market shares reduces the degree of sectoral adjustment but also comes at a high welfare cost.
ISSN:0095-0696
1096-0449
DOI:10.1006/jeem.1999.1112