Kelsen's Concept of the Authority of Law
According to Kelsen, law is a sense content and law has authority. The combination of these two claims appears puzzling. How is it possible for a sense content to have authority? Kelsen's notion of 'basic norm' seems to provide an answer to this question. Such an answer, however, simp...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Law and philosophy 2000-03, Vol.19 (2), p.173-199 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | According to Kelsen, law is a sense content and law has authority. The combination of these two claims appears puzzling. How is it possible for a sense content to have authority? Kelsen's notion of 'basic norm' seems to provide an answer to this question. Such an answer, however, simply leads to a new formulation of the question itself. How is a basic norm possible? Kelsen's multiple and tentative answers to this question turn out to be untenable. A different starting point might be provided by Kelsen's notion of 'social power'. On closer scrutiny, however, an empowerment account of Kelsen's concept of the authority of law proves unsatisfactory. Thus, our review of some candidate models for a Kelsenian explication of the authority of law shows that none of them is a viable hypothesis. Kelsen's concept of the authority of law is, at bottom, unintelligible. |
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ISSN: | 0167-5249 1573-0522 |
DOI: | 10.2307/3505164 |