Regulatory competition and the global coordination of labor standards

This paper develops a framework for analyzing regulatory competition in labor standards. Labor standards are categorized into 'rule-types', and it is shown that different rule-types are affected differently by interjurisdictional competition for trade or investment. In particular, 'purely efficient' rules are likely to be unaffected by interjurisdictional competition, while interjurisdictional competition may exert substantial pressure on rules with distributive impacts. The paper then turns to the political implications of this analysis. Conceptions of 'rights' are largely inapt to the analysis of interjurisdictional competition; but democratic theory, as well as a commitment to global equity, may call for the development of trans-national institutions which would coordinate the setting of labor standards in order to mitigate the effects of interjurisdictional competition. The paper concludes by identifying problems in the design of these trans-national labor institutions. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]