Market Organisation and Trading Relationships
In this paper we give a theoretical model of buyers' behaviour on a market for a perishable good where no prices are posted. We show that if buyers learn from their own previous experience there is a sharp division between those who learn to be loyal to certain sellers and those who continue to...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Economic journal (London) 2000-04, Vol.110 (463), p.411-436 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | In this paper we give a theoretical model of buyers' behaviour on a market for a perishable good where no prices are posted. We show that if buyers learn from their own previous experience there is a sharp division between those who learn to be loyal to certain sellers and those who continue to `shop around'. This feature remains in more general models which are simulated and is consistent with empirical data from the Marseille fish market. |
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ISSN: | 0013-0133 1468-0297 |
DOI: | 10.1111/1468-0297.00531 |