Market Organisation and Trading Relationships

In this paper we give a theoretical model of buyers' behaviour on a market for a perishable good where no prices are posted. We show that if buyers learn from their own previous experience there is a sharp division between those who learn to be loyal to certain sellers and those who continue to...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The Economic journal (London) 2000-04, Vol.110 (463), p.411-436
Hauptverfasser: Weisbuch, Gerard, Kirman, Alan, Herreiner, Dorothea
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this paper we give a theoretical model of buyers' behaviour on a market for a perishable good where no prices are posted. We show that if buyers learn from their own previous experience there is a sharp division between those who learn to be loyal to certain sellers and those who continue to `shop around'. This feature remains in more general models which are simulated and is consistent with empirical data from the Marseille fish market.
ISSN:0013-0133
1468-0297
DOI:10.1111/1468-0297.00531