Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers
This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents in...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International economic review (Philadelphia) 2000-02, Vol.41 (1), p.93-116 |
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| creator | Bloch, Francis Ryder, Harl |
| description | This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class. Marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/1468-2354.00056 |
| format | Article |
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Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class. Marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary.</abstract><cop>Oxford, UK and Boston, USA</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishers Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/1468-2354.00056</doi><tpages>24</tpages></addata></record> |
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| source | Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Wiley Online Library All Journals |
| subjects | Brokerages Economic behaviour Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium Fees Housing market Intelligent agents Job search firms Market mechanisms Market potential Market prices Marriage Men Modeling Partners Social economics Studies Trade intermediaries Utility models |
| title | Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers |
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