Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers

This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents in...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International economic review (Philadelphia) 2000-02, Vol.41 (1), p.93-116
Hauptverfasser:	Bloch, Francis, Ryder, Harl
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Brokerages Economic behaviour Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium Fees Housing market Intelligent agents Job search firms Market mechanisms Market potential Market prices Marriage Men Modeling Partners Social economics Studies Trade intermediaries Utility models
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class. Marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary.
ISSN:	0020-6598 1468-2354
DOI:	10.1111/1468-2354.00056