Choquet Rationality

Consider a decision problem under uncertainty for a decision maker with known (utility) payoffs over prizes. We say that an act is Choquet ( Shafer, Bernoulli) rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her “expected” utility. We show that an ac...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of economic theory 2000-02, Vol.90 (2), p.277-285
Hauptverfasser: Ghirardato, Paolo, Le Breton, Michel
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Consider a decision problem under uncertainty for a decision maker with known (utility) payoffs over prizes. We say that an act is Choquet ( Shafer, Bernoulli) rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her “expected” utility. We show that an act may be Choquet rational without being Bernoulli rational, but it is Choquet rational if and only if it is Shafer rational. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1006/jeth.1999.2599