Balancing budget through tax increases or expenditure cuts: is it neutral?

Fiscal adjustment currently ranks at the top in the economic policy agenda of many OECD countries, and not only those European countries aiming to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. Recently, Alesina and Perotti argued that successful cases of fiscal adjustment resulted from cutting expenditures, while those focusing on tax increases were unsuccessful. The paper, using a bivariate VECM representation for the joint government revenue–government expenditure dynamics for five of the main OECD countries, provides two contributions to this issue. First, it proposes and performs a neutrality test of the alternative adjustment strategies (through revenue or expenditures), second it characterizes the departure from neutrality in the three countries where the neutrality hypothesis is rejected. The conclusion, prevailing for these three countries, is that adjustment through taxes not only is inefficient, but even results in a perverse effect with induced extra expenditures which more than offset the increase in government revenue.