Jurors' Use of Naked Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect
G. L. Wells (1992) demonstrated that jurors react differently to probabilistic evidence indicating that there is an 80% chance the defendant committed an act than they do to 80% reliable evidence indicating the defendant committed an act. Even though jurors report that the probability of guilt is ap...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of personality and social psychology 1999-04, Vol.76 (4), p.533-542 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | G. L. Wells (1992)
demonstrated that jurors react differently to probabilistic evidence indicating that there is an 80% chance the defendant committed an act than they do to 80% reliable evidence indicating the defendant committed an act. Even though jurors report that the probability of guilt is approximately 80% for both forms, they are much more likely to find against the defendant in the latter than in the former case, a phenomenon the authors term the
Wells effect.
Three experiments explore a variety of possible explanations for the Wells effect. Results provided the most consistent support for an
ease-of-simulation
mechanism, which holds that jurors are more reluctant to convict when they can easily simulate a scenario in which the defendant is not guilty. |
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ISSN: | 0022-3514 1939-1315 |
DOI: | 10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.533 |