Jurors' Use of Naked Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect

G. L. Wells (1992) demonstrated that jurors react differently to probabilistic evidence indicating that there is an 80% chance the defendant committed an act than they do to 80% reliable evidence indicating the defendant committed an act. Even though jurors report that the probability of guilt is ap...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of personality and social psychology 1999-04, Vol.76 (4), p.533-542
Hauptverfasser: Niedermeier, Keith E, Kerr, Norbert L, Messé, Lawrence A
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:G. L. Wells (1992) demonstrated that jurors react differently to probabilistic evidence indicating that there is an 80% chance the defendant committed an act than they do to 80% reliable evidence indicating the defendant committed an act. Even though jurors report that the probability of guilt is approximately 80% for both forms, they are much more likely to find against the defendant in the latter than in the former case, a phenomenon the authors term the Wells effect. Three experiments explore a variety of possible explanations for the Wells effect. Results provided the most consistent support for an ease-of-simulation mechanism, which holds that jurors are more reluctant to convict when they can easily simulate a scenario in which the defendant is not guilty.
ISSN:0022-3514
1939-1315
DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.533