Crime, Control and Environmental Policy: The Case of Hazardous Wastes

Crime, Control and Environmental Policy: The Case of Hazardous Wastes

In the context of a model of principal–agency the institutional setting in which the agency operates is investigated. Optimal behaviour for an agency which is restricted to enforcement policies is deduced, and further behavioural interactions between the firm and the restricted agency are explored....

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Veröffentlicht in:Metroeconomica 1999-02, Vol.50 (1), p.1-33
1. Verfasser: Gottinger, Hans W.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Cost analysis
Crime
Environmental policy
Hazardous waste
Law enforcement
Pollution
Waste management
Welfare
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In the context of a model of principal–agency the institutional setting in which the agency operates is investigated. Optimal behaviour for an agency which is restricted to enforcement policies is deduced, and further behavioural interactions between the firm and the restricted agency are explored. Also the firm's behavioural responses to agency dump fee policies are developed, and the welfare implications are derived.
ISSN:0026-1386
1467-999X
DOI:10.1111/1467-999X.00060