Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart

Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart

In a public good experiment one group member is replaced by another after a prespecified number of periods. Evidence of both strategic (forward looking) and adaptive (backward looking) behavior is observed.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 1999, Vol.62 (1), p.35-41
Hauptverfasser: Sonnemans, Joep, Schram, Arthur, Offerman, Theo
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic strategies
Experiment
Game theory
Games
Learning
Public good games
Public goods
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In a public good experiment one group member is replaced by another after a prespecified number of periods. Evidence of both strategic (forward looking) and adaptive (backward looking) behavior is observed.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00203-1