Bank performance and executive compensation: a managerial discretion perspective

This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive's managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank's strategic domain, and its regulatory environme...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Strategic management journal 1997-08, Vol.18 (7), p.573-581
Hauptverfasser:	Magnan, Michael L., St-onge, Sylvie
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Applied sciences Bank assets Bank stocks Banking Banking industry Banking regulation Banks Branch banking CEO compensation Chief executive officers commercial banking Commercial banks Compensation Compensation plans Decision making Diversification Economic performance Exact sciences and technology Executive compensation Financial management Firm modelling firm performance Hypotheses International banking Investigations managerial discretion Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Organizational behavior Portfolio theory Proxy statements Regional banks Regulation Research Notes and Communications Retail banking Stock options Strategic management Studies Wages & salaries Wholesale banking
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive's managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank's strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion.
ISSN:	0143-2095 1097-0266
DOI:	10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199708)18:7<573::AID-SMJ900>3.0.CO;2-K