The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules
Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!−1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggrega...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic theory 1997-08, Vol.75 (2), p.237-270 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!−1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionn!1−τ0.4714n!.This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71. |
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ISSN: | 0022-0531 1097-3923 1095-7235 1467-9779 |
DOI: | 10.1006/jeth.1996.2233 |