Bid sensitivity and the structure of the Vickrey auction

The sensitivity of revealed values given alternative configurations of the Vickrey auction is examined. A standard second-price auction with repeated market trials is compared to two other types of auctions

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	American journal of agricultural economics 1994-12, Vol.76 (5), p.1089-1095
Hauptverfasser:	Shogren, Jason F., Hayes, Dermot J., Kliebenstein, James B., Fox, John A.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agricultural economics Auction markets Auctions Bidding Bids Candy bars comportamiento del consumidor comportement du consommateur consumer behaviour D440 Dominant strategy economic theories Economic theory Endowments Experimentation Financial risk Lotteries Market prices precios de mercado Preferences prix de marche riesgo risk risque subastas teorias economicas theorie economique Valuation Value Value Elicitation in Laboratory Markets vente aux encheres
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	The sensitivity of revealed values given alternative configurations of the Vickrey auction is examined. A standard second-price auction with repeated market trials is compared to two other types of auctions
ISSN:	0002-9092 1467-8276
DOI:	10.2307/1243397