Motivation as a limit to pricing
A monetary reward offered by a principal tends to crowd out an agent's willingness to perform the task for its own sake (i.e. based on intrinsic motivation) if the agent's sense of recognition, fairness, or self-determination are thereby negatively affected. The crowding-out effect of pric...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic psychology 1993-12, Vol.14 (4), p.635-664 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | A monetary reward offered by a principal tends to crowd out an agent's willingness to perform the task for its own sake (i.e. based on intrinsic motivation) if the agent's sense of recognition, fairness, or self-determination are thereby negatively affected. The
crowding-out
effect of pricing may also spill over into sectors where no pricing is applied (
spillover effect) if the persons affected find it costly to dinstinguish their motivations according to sectors. Motivation crowding-out and spillover narrow the scope for successfully applying monetary rewards. These theoretical claims are supported by real-life observations for environmental policy and blood donations. |
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ISSN: | 0167-4870 1872-7719 |
DOI: | 10.1016/0167-4870(93)90014-C |