Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power

This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internal...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The American economic review 2002-12, Vol.92 (5), p.1357-1375
1. Verfasser: Brueckner, Jan K.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 1375
container_issue 5
container_start_page 1357
container_title The American economic review
container_volume 92
creator Brueckner, Jan K.
description This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.
doi_str_mv 10.1257/000282802762024548
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38412649</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>3083254</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>3083254</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c452t-6cb92a37fc978947cfa8f4b81f6e540b62ffc13f18ce945daf4eb869d3b59fa33</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNplkMFKAzEURYMoWKs_IC4GF-5Gk5eXSbIsg1pB0YXiMmTSRKe2k5pMFf_eKRUXuno8OOdyuYQcM3rOQMgLSikoUBRkBRRQoNohI6YRS6kV2yWjDVAOBOyTg5zndPMzOSIwadMqpr6oY_fic9_Grnh-9V1R25Ran3IxtR--uLPpzffFQ_z06ZDsBbvI_ujnjsnT1eVjPS1v769v6slt6VBAX1au0WC5DE5LpVG6YFXARrFQeYG0qSAEx3hgynmNYmYD-kZVesYboYPlfEzOtrmrFN_XQzezbLPzi4XtfFxnwxUyqFAP4OkfcB7XqRu6GeCcgmAUBwi2kEsx5-SDWaV2adOXYdRsNjT_Nxykk600z31MvwanioNA_g0r52vG</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>233025104</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power</title><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>American Economic Association Web</source><creator>Brueckner, Jan K.</creator><creatorcontrib>Brueckner, Jan K.</creatorcontrib><description>This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0002-8282</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1944-7981</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1257/000282802762024548</identifier><identifier>CODEN: AENRAA</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Nashville: American Economic Association</publisher><subject>Air fares ; Air traffic ; Aircraft ; Airline scheduling ; Airlines ; Airports ; Civil aviation ; Congestion ; Economic models ; Economics ; Flight operations ; Market power ; Monopolies ; Oligopoly ; Operating costs ; Passengers ; Roads &amp; highways ; Studies ; Tolls ; Traffic congestion ; Traffic delay ; Travel ; Vehicular flight</subject><ispartof>The American economic review, 2002-12, Vol.92 (5), p.1357-1375</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2002 American Economic Association</rights><rights>Copyright American Economic Association Dec 2002</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c452t-6cb92a37fc978947cfa8f4b81f6e540b62ffc13f18ce945daf4eb869d3b59fa33</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c452t-6cb92a37fc978947cfa8f4b81f6e540b62ffc13f18ce945daf4eb869d3b59fa33</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3083254$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3083254$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,3748,27924,27925,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Brueckner, Jan K.</creatorcontrib><title>Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power</title><title>The American economic review</title><description>This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.</description><subject>Air fares</subject><subject>Air traffic</subject><subject>Aircraft</subject><subject>Airline scheduling</subject><subject>Airlines</subject><subject>Airports</subject><subject>Civil aviation</subject><subject>Congestion</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Flight operations</subject><subject>Market power</subject><subject>Monopolies</subject><subject>Oligopoly</subject><subject>Operating costs</subject><subject>Passengers</subject><subject>Roads &amp; highways</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Tolls</subject><subject>Traffic congestion</subject><subject>Traffic delay</subject><subject>Travel</subject><subject>Vehicular flight</subject><issn>0002-8282</issn><issn>1944-7981</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2002</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNplkMFKAzEURYMoWKs_IC4GF-5Gk5eXSbIsg1pB0YXiMmTSRKe2k5pMFf_eKRUXuno8OOdyuYQcM3rOQMgLSikoUBRkBRRQoNohI6YRS6kV2yWjDVAOBOyTg5zndPMzOSIwadMqpr6oY_fic9_Grnh-9V1R25Ran3IxtR--uLPpzffFQ_z06ZDsBbvI_ujnjsnT1eVjPS1v769v6slt6VBAX1au0WC5DE5LpVG6YFXARrFQeYG0qSAEx3hgynmNYmYD-kZVesYboYPlfEzOtrmrFN_XQzezbLPzi4XtfFxnwxUyqFAP4OkfcB7XqRu6GeCcgmAUBwi2kEsx5-SDWaV2adOXYdRsNjT_Nxykk600z31MvwanioNA_g0r52vG</recordid><startdate>20021201</startdate><enddate>20021201</enddate><creator>Brueckner, Jan K.</creator><general>American Economic Association</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>88E</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M1P</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20021201</creationdate><title>Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power</title><author>Brueckner, Jan K.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c452t-6cb92a37fc978947cfa8f4b81f6e540b62ffc13f18ce945daf4eb869d3b59fa33</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2002</creationdate><topic>Air fares</topic><topic>Air traffic</topic><topic>Aircraft</topic><topic>Airline scheduling</topic><topic>Airlines</topic><topic>Airports</topic><topic>Civil aviation</topic><topic>Congestion</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Flight operations</topic><topic>Market power</topic><topic>Monopolies</topic><topic>Oligopoly</topic><topic>Operating costs</topic><topic>Passengers</topic><topic>Roads &amp; highways</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Tolls</topic><topic>Traffic congestion</topic><topic>Traffic delay</topic><topic>Travel</topic><topic>Vehicular flight</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Brueckner, Jan K.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>Global News &amp; ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Health &amp; Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Medical Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Health &amp; Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Health &amp; Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Medical Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Brueckner, Jan K.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power</atitle><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle><date>2002-12-01</date><risdate>2002</risdate><volume>92</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>1357</spage><epage>1375</epage><pages>1357-1375</pages><issn>0002-8282</issn><eissn>1944-7981</eissn><coden>AENRAA</coden><abstract>This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.</abstract><cop>Nashville</cop><pub>American Economic Association</pub><doi>10.1257/000282802762024548</doi><tpages>19</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0002-8282
ispartof The American economic review, 2002-12, Vol.92 (5), p.1357-1375
issn 0002-8282
1944-7981
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38412649
source EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; American Economic Association Web
subjects Air fares
Air traffic
Aircraft
Airline scheduling
Airlines
Airports
Civil aviation
Congestion
Economic models
Economics
Flight operations
Market power
Monopolies
Oligopoly
Operating costs
Passengers
Roads & highways
Studies
Tolls
Traffic congestion
Traffic delay
Travel
Vehicular flight
title Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-19T00%3A29%3A20IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Airport%20Congestion%20When%20Carriers%20Have%20Market%20Power&rft.jtitle=The%20American%20economic%20review&rft.au=Brueckner,%20Jan%20K.&rft.date=2002-12-01&rft.volume=92&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=1357&rft.epage=1375&rft.pages=1357-1375&rft.issn=0002-8282&rft.eissn=1944-7981&rft.coden=AENRAA&rft_id=info:doi/10.1257/000282802762024548&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E3083254%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=233025104&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=3083254&rfr_iscdi=true