Fairness versus efficiency: An experimental study of (mutual) gift giving

Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games, such as the prisoners’ dilemma. In our experiment, the participants can increase efficiency by giving gifts. In the one-sid...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of economic behavior & organization 2003-04, Vol.50 (4), p.465-475
Hauptverfasser: Güth, Werner, Kliemt, Hartmut, Ockenfels, Axel
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games, such as the prisoners’ dilemma. In our experiment, the participants can increase efficiency by giving gifts. In the one-sided treatment, this is only possible for one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutual gift giving. In both cases, decisions can be conditioned on whether there is or there is not an efficiency gain by gift giving. Our results indicate that efficiency concerns are dominated by fairness concerns that are less stringent in mutual exchanges than in one-sided gift relationships.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00037-9