Working and Shirking: Equilibrium in Public‐Goods Games with Overlapping Generations of Players

In overlapping‐generations models of public‐goods provision, in which the contribution decision is binary and lifetimes are finite, the set of symmetric subgame‐perfect equilibria can be categorized into three types: seniority equilibria, in which players contribute (effort) until a predetermined ag...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of law, economics, & organization economics, & organization, 2001-10, Vol.17 (2), p.285-318
Hauptverfasser: Dickson, Eric S., Shepsle, Kenneth A.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In overlapping‐generations models of public‐goods provision, in which the contribution decision is binary and lifetimes are finite, the set of symmetric subgame‐perfect equilibria can be categorized into three types: seniority equilibria, in which players contribute (effort) until a predetermined age and then shirk thereafter; dependency equilibria, in which players initially shirk, then contribute for a set number of periods, then shirk for the remainder of their lives; and sabbatical equilibria, in which players alternately contribute and shirk for periods of varying length before entering a final stage of shirking. In a world without discounting we establish conditions for equilibrium and demonstrate that for any dependency equilibrium there is a seniority equilibrium that Pareto dominates it ex ante. We proceed to characterize generational preferences over alternative seniority equilibria. We explore the aggregation of these preferences by embedding the public‐goods provision game in a voting framework and solving for the majority‐rule equilibria. In this way we can think of political processes as providing one natural framework for equilibrium selection in the original public‐goods provision game.
ISSN:8756-6222
1465-7341
1465-7341
DOI:10.1093/jleo/17.2.285