Governance of electricity transmission systems
This paper examines three different governance mechanisms for electricity transmission systems. A regulated transmission company (“Transco”) solution suffers from the usual problems of regulatory slack in a natural monopoly. A not-for-profit independent system operator (“NISO”) solution solves the r...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Energy economics 2005-03, Vol.27 (2), p.237-255 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This paper examines three different governance mechanisms for electricity transmission systems. A regulated transmission company (“Transco”) solution suffers from the usual problems of regulatory slack in a natural monopoly. A not-for-profit independent system operator (“NISO”) solution solves the regulatory slack problem by being involved in the day-to-day operations; however, the NISO solution suffers from the problem that the NISO directors can become “captured” by industry, leading to inefficient outcomes. In contrast, a for-profit independent system operator (“PISO”) solves the regulatory slack problem and is not subject to political pressure from industry. |
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ISSN: | 0140-9883 1873-6181 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.eneco.2004.12.004 |