When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons

When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons

In repeated public goods experiments, ruling out information about an exact, commonly known, and symmetric terminal period does not alter average contributions significantly, although asymmetric information about the time horizon reduces the frequency of end-game effects.

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2005-08, Vol.88 (2), p.221-226
Hauptverfasser: González, Luis G., Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Asymmetric information
End-game effect
Experimental economics
Game theory
Mathematical methods
Public goods
Public goods experiment
Time
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In repeated public goods experiments, ruling out information about an exact, commonly known, and symmetric terminal period does not alter average contributions significantly, although asymmetric information about the time horizon reduces the frequency of end-game effects.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.010