Crony Capitalism and Financial System Stability

Prior to the Asian financial crisis, the cozy relationships between corporations, governments, and banks were seen as a potent force for economic growth and development. In this article we examine the institution of crony capitalism. Under conditions in which the Second Welfare Theorem does not hold...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economic inquiry 2005-01, Vol.43 (1), p.24-38
Hauptverfasser: Haslag, Joseph H., Pecchenino, Rowena
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Prior to the Asian financial crisis, the cozy relationships between corporations, governments, and banks were seen as a potent force for economic growth and development. In this article we examine the institution of crony capitalism. Under conditions in which the Second Welfare Theorem does not hold, there is a role for government. Some governmental institutions do encourage more risky, high‐payoff entrepreneurial activities. Our aim is to examine crony capitalism as a potential source of government activity that enhances economic productivity. In addition, we explore the conditions under which the government activity can instigate a financial crisis.
ISSN:0095-2583
1465-7295
DOI:10.1093/ei/cbi003