The Atheist's Free Will Offence

This paper criticizes the assumption, omnipresent in contemporary philosophy of religion, that a perfectly good and loving God would wish to confer on (at least some) finite persons free will. An alternative mode of Divine-human relationship is introduced and shown to be as conducive to the realizat...

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal for philosophy of religion 2004-08, Vol.56 (1), p.1-15
1. Verfasser: Schellenberg, J. L.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This paper criticizes the assumption, omnipresent in contemporary philosophy of religion, that a perfectly good and loving God would wish to confer on (at least some) finite persons free will. An alternative mode of Divine-human relationship is introduced and shown to be as conducive to the realization of value as one involving free will. Certain implications of this result are then revealed, to wit, that the theist's free will defence against the problem of evil is unsuccessful, and what is more, that free will, if it exists, provides positive support for atheism.
ISSN:0020-7047
1572-8684
DOI:10.1007/s11153-004-4626-3