On the irrelevance of government debt when taxes are distortionary

We consider a government that can only raise funds by levying distortionary taxes. We allow the government to collect taxes in a given period that are based on incomes earned in previous periods. We show that once we do so, given any debt path, the government can adjust its tax policy so as to attai...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of monetary economics 2004-03, Vol.51 (2), p.299-304
Hauptverfasser: Bassetto, Marco, Kocherlakota, Narayana
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We consider a government that can only raise funds by levying distortionary taxes. We allow the government to collect taxes in a given period that are based on incomes earned in previous periods. We show that once we do so, given any debt path, the government can adjust its tax policy so as to attain that debt path without affecting equilibrium allocations or prices.
ISSN:0304-3932
1873-1295
DOI:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2002.12.001