Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy

Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy

We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases.

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2004-03, Vol.82 (3), p.409-414
Hauptverfasser: Neary, J.Peter, Leahy, Dermot
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economics
Export subsidies
Exports
Industry
R&D subsidies
Research and development
Social cost of funds
Social costs
Strategic trade policy
Subsidies
Trade
Trade policy
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.019